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legal and legislative issues
The legal status 
of race-conscious 
remedies present 
challenges for 
education leaders, 
policymakers, and 
lawmakers.
Race-Based Preferences 
and the Supreme Court
Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.
So-called race-conscious remedies ensure that all citizens are consid-ered fairly and equally for employ-ment and education opportunities. 
The legal status of race-conscious remedies 
continues to present challenges for educa-
tion leaders, policymakers, and lawmakers.
For example, in a recent case, Schuette 
v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 
(2014), a fractured Supreme Court upheld a 
state constitutional amendment prohibiting 
the use of race in a variety of public arenas.
As author of the opinion on behalf of 
the three-member plurality of the Supreme 
Court, including Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy began by 
establishing that “[t]he Court in this case 
must determine whether an amendment 
to the Constitution of the State of Michi-
gan, approved and enacted by its voters, is 
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States.” (p. 1629).
In examining the facts, Justice Kennedy 
pointed out that Schuette arose largely as a 
response to the 2003 companion cases Grut-
ter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger which 
upheld and invalided, respectively, the use 
of affirmative action plans in admissions 
programs at the University of Michigan. 
Unhappy with these cases, citizens initiated 
a 2006 ballot proposal called Proposal 2, 
which passed by a margin of 58% to 42%. 
The enactment became an amendment to 
the Michigan Constitute and in broad terms 
states in Section 26 that the state (which 
includes “any public college, university, or 
community college, school district”) “shall 
not discriminate against, or grant preferen-
tial treatment to, any individual or group 
on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of public 
employment, public education, or public 
contracting.”
Critics of Proposal 2 quickly filed suit 
claiming that the State of Michigan unfairly 
disadvantaged those who sought to use the 
political process via a ballot initiative to 
mandate racial preferences. However, a fed-
eral trial court granted the state’s motions 
for summary judgment (BAMN v. Regents 
of University of Michigan 2008a) and 
later denied a motion for reconsideration 
(BAMN v. Regents of University of Michi-
gan, 2008b).
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit invalidated 
Proposal 2 on the ground that it violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by denying minorities the 
opportunity to engage in the political lives 
of their communities (BAMN v. Regents of 
University of Michigan 2011). An en banc 
panel of the Sixth Circuit, on further review, 
in an eight-to-seven judgment, agreed that 
Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. Relying on the political process 
doctrine, the court contended that insofar 
as structures such as Proposal 2 that are 
designed to impose “special burdens on the 
ability of minority groups to achieve ben-
eficial legislation” (BAMN v. Regents of 
University of Michigan, 2012, p. 474) are 
subject to strict scrutiny, the highest level of 
analysis, it was unconstitutional.
Prior to Schuette, a similar dispute arose 
in California with the opposite result. 
The Ninth Circuit upheld another voter-
approved initiative, Proposal 209, under 
which “(a) The state shall not discriminate 
against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of 
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national ori-
gin in the operation of public employment, 
public education, or public contracting” 
(Coalition for Affirmative Action v. Brown 
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2012, p, 1132). In light of this split 
between the circuits, the Supreme 
Court granted the State of Michi-
gan’s appeal (Schuette v. Coalition 
to Defend Affirmative Action, 2013) 
and reversed in its favor.
Supreme Court Opinions
PLURALITY
At the outset of his rationale, Justice 
Kennedy pointed out that “[b]efore 
the Court addresses the question 
presented, it is important to note 
what this case is not about. It is not 
about the constitutionality, or the 
merits, of race-conscious admis-
sions policies in higher education” 
(p. 1630). Recognizing that race-
conscious admissions plans present 
complex questions, he indicated that 
the dispute did not disturb the per-
missible use of race in some circum-
stances. Rather, Kennedy repeated 
a theme that ran throughout his 
judgment: the dispute was not over 
the permissible use of such policies 
in admissions but whether and how 
state voters can elect to forbid gov-
ernmental officials from using race 
in education and other arenas.
Justice Kennedy chided the Sixth 
Circuit for unnecessarily extending 
the rationale of one of the Supreme 
Court’s earlier judgments, Wash-
ington v. Seattle School District 
No. 1 (1982). In Seattle the Court 
ruled that insofar as a voter initia-
tive impermissibly classified persons 
due to race in attempting to end 
mandatory bussing to achieve racial 
integration, it violated the equal 
protection rights of minority stu-
dents. Kennedy thus explained that 
it was necessary to review a trilogy 
of Supreme Court cases culminating 
in Seattle because of their impact on 
Schuette.
In Reitman v. Mulkey (1967) 
the Supreme Court invalidated an 
amendment to California’s constitu-
tion that attempted to prohibit the 
state legislature from interfering 
with the rights of property owners 
to rent or sell to others regardless 
of their reasons. The Mulkey Court 
struck down the amendment in 
viewing it as involving the state in 
private acts of discrimination.
In Hunter v. Erickson (1969), the 
Supreme Court vitiated an amend-
ment to a city charter in Ohio that 
obligated city council ordinances 
regulating specified real estate trans-
actions on basis of race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, or ancestry to 
be approved by a majority of voters. 
In ordering public officials to enforce 
fair-housing mandates, the Court 
rejected the ordinance as placing an 
unfair burden on minorities in what 
it described as the “governmental 
process” (p. 562).
Returning to Seattle, Justice Ken-
nedy pointed out that the disputed 
voter initiative that sought to end 
mandatory bussing was part of a 
settlement agreement designed to 
reduce racial imbalances even absent 
a finding of de jure segregation. Yet, 
in Seattle, the Justices rejected the 
initiative because it would have vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause by 
burdening the interests of minorities.
Justice Kennedy criticized the 
analyses of both the Supreme Court 
in Seattle and the Sixth Circuit as 
exceeding the boundaries needed to 
resolve Schuette in pursuit of pro-
tecting the interests of minorities. 
He voiced a key concern that the 
over-reliance by the lower courts 
on Seattle may have validated racial 
divisions by disempowering voters 
from adopting courses of permis-
sible action forbidding race-based 
preferences.
Justice Kennedy reasoned that 
unlike Mukley, Hunter, and Seattle, 
Schuette did not focus on how 
to redress injuries based on race. 
Rather, he added that Schuette was 
concerned with whether voters 
could decide the future of race-based 
preferences. In so doing, Justice 
Kennedy indicated that Michigan 
voters enacted a state constitutional 
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amendment bypassing public offi-
cials whom they deemed unrespon-
sive to their concerns.
Aware of the need for free and 
open debate remain on sensitive 
issues, Justice Kennedy posited that 
invalidating Proposal 2 would have 
impeded and demeaned the demo-
cratic process by presuming that 
voters were incapable of resolving 
important issues of policy decently 
and reasonably. He suggested that 
citizens have the right, and duty, to 
engage in such discourse consistent 
with their free speech rights under 
the First Amendment.
Rounding out his rationale, Jus-
tice Kennedy reiterated that Mukley, 
Hunter, and Seattle were inapplica-
ble in Schuette because they involved 
the use of governmentally imposed 
political restrictions that may have 
caused harm based on race. Instead, 
Kennedy wrote that in Schuette 
the issue was whether voters could 
instruct the government to eschew 
a course of action in relying on race 
in a manner they deemed unwise 
due to fears that it could lead to 
resentment and hostility. He speci-
fied that although the fears voiced 
by the majority of voters may not 
have come to pass about race based 
preferences, the issue is subject to 
debate.
In sum, Justice Kennedy deter-
mined that Schuette “is not about 
how the debate about racial prefer-
ences should be resolved. It is about 
who may resolve it” (p. 1638). 
He thus concluded that insofar 
as democracy allows debate over 
sensitive issues such as racial prefer-
ences, this was a matter best left to 
the will of the voters in the State of 
Michigan.
CONCURRENCES
Chief Justice Roberts. The Chief 
Justice devoted his two paragraph 
concurrence to rebutting 11 pages 
of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent which 
argued in favor of racial preferences 
in higher education. To this end, 
Roberts pointedly responded to 
Justice Sotomayor that if anything, 
racial preferences “have the debili-
tating effect of reinforcing precisely 
that doubt [about whether minority 
students truly belong on campuses], 
and—if so—that the preferences 
do more harm than good” (pp. 
1638-39).
Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence, joined by Justice 
Thomas, wondered whether, in 
light of Justice Sotomayor’s dis-
sent, those who voted to end racial 
preferences could, paradoxically, 
have been accused of discrimination 
even as they sought equal treatment 
for all regardless of race. He would 
have gone further than the Court 
by overturning both Hunter and 
Seattle while disavowing the political 
process doctrine and its reliance on 
race-conscious remedies.
Justice Breyer. In his three-page 
concurrence, Justice Breyer agreed 
that insofar as Proposal 2 afforded 
voters, rather than non-elected 
campus officials, decision mak-
ing over racial preferences, it was 
constitutional.
DISSENT
Justice Sotomayor’s 27-page dis-
sent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, was 
about three times the length of the 
plurality. Her main point seemed 
to be that public officials essentially 
should be free to discriminate based 
on race by providing special advan-
tages to minority groups, despite 
the wishes of the majority of voters 
grounded on the notion that “race 
matters” (p. 1676).
Discussion
It is important to recognize that less 
than a majority of Justices joined in 
the Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Schuette—resulting in the plurality. 
Accordingly, Schuette is of limited 
precedential value because it is bind-
ing only on the parties in a suit and, 
here, the Sixth Circuit, which con-
sists of Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, 
and Tennessee.
Yet, to the extent that Schuette 
is a decision of the Supreme Court, 
education leaders, regardless where 
they work and live, must be mind-
ful of its holding because it is some 
indication of where the Justices may 
be headed on racial preferences and 
particularly with regard to the politi-
cal process doctrine. 
As broad-based as Proposal 2 is, 
though, touching on a variety of 
public programs, as is often the case 
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in disputes involving race-conscious 
remedies, Schuette leaves more ques-
tions unresolved than answered. 
The lack of clarity resulting from 
Schuette is mostly because the plu-
rality limited its order to acknowl-
edging that states may allow voters 
to forbid the use of race in specifi ed 
circumstances but are not obligated 
to do so.
Post-Schuette uncertainty is likely 
to lead to additional litigation insofar 
as the Supreme Court stopped short 
of resolving the ultimate question of 
whether race-based preferences in 
education and other areas of public 
life are acceptable under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Consequently, 
to the extent that education leaders 
may wish to take race into account 
in such areas as student assignments 
and hiring, Schuette seems to make 
these tasks more diffi cult because the 
rules are not entirely clear.
Amid disputes over the future of 
race-conscious remedies, an inter-
esting dynamic in Schuette was the 
interplay between the members 
of the Supreme Court over the 
appropriateness of race-conscious 
remedies, especially as they play 
out in education under the guise of 
the political process doctrine. As in 
many other areas such as religion, 
the tension between the Justices 
continues to represent a deep divide 
on the High Court bench.
Perhaps the key outcome of 
Schuette is that if one combines the 
votes of the members of the plural-
ity with Justice Scalia’s concurrence, 
which was joined by Justice Thomas, 
a bare majority of the Supreme 
Court seems to be willing to elimi-
nate the political process doctrine. If 
the Court were to move away from 
this doctrine, it may make it easier 
for those who disfavor programs 
designed to afford race-based prefer-
ences in education and other public 
arenas to initiate legal challenges.
At the bottom line, it may be that 
the most signifi cant outcome of 
Schuette is that it might make it easier 
for those who question the appropri-
ateness of racial preferences to chal-
lenge such remedies that are designed 
to reach the elusive goal of equity 
by calling for laws and policies to 
enhance opportunities for all regard-
less of race. Still, it remains to be seen 
whether this will come to pass.
Conclusion
Insofar as issues involving race 
remain highly charged, the pursuit 
of equity has become a seemingly 
unending saga that is not much 
closer to resolution as a result of 
Schuette. Thus, although Schuette 
may signal the demise of the political 
process doctrine, the fi nal quest for 
racial equity is far from over.
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TRADITIONAL (SCOREKEEPER) CFO VS STRATEGIC CFO
Scorekeeper CFO
  Number cruncher
 “Dr. No” on spending
  Risk manager
  Reporting and compliance hawk
  Bank or funder of others’ priorities
  Book balancer
  Cost cutter
Strategic CFO
  Capacity builder: Educates and communicates with dis-
trict leadership and the community about cost drivers and 
trade-off s
  Value champion: Furthers value and best return for dollars 
invested by promoting a return-on-investment process that 
assesses how all district resources are aligned with priorities
  Strategic partner: Teams with the chief academic offi  cer, or 
CAO, to integrate fi nancial and instructional perspectives
  Planner: Looks long term and addresses sustainability
  Strategist: Makes the budget a tool for accomplishing stra-
tegic goals
From The New Education CFO: From Scorekeeper to Strategic Leader. 2014. The Center for American Progress. 
